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Introduction
In the 1940s, the famous Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter introduced the notion of creative destruction in his book, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. In his words:
"The fundamental impulse that keeps the capital engine in motion comes from the new consumers'goods, the new methods of production and transportation, the new markets.. [The process] incessantly revolutionizes from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact of capitalism.", Schumpeter (1942) Theoretical and empirical work has rediscovered this notion at the beginning of the 1990s, leading to a theory of Schumpeterian growth, formalizing the main ideas in Schumpeter's work.
There is now considerable evidence that the reallocation process has important e¢ ciency consequences and contributes signi…cantly to productivity growth. For example, in the US, half of total factor productivity growth over the course of a decade can be accounted for by the reallocation of outputs and inputs away from less productive to more productive businesses (Haltiwanger, 2000) . In Poland, Warzynski (2003) found a signi…cant and positive relationship between labor productivity growth and excess job reallocation.
However, the process of creative destruction can also have important social consequences if workers are not reallocated smoothly from old jobs to 1 the new ones. If individuals have outdated skills, it is likely that …nding a new employer will be very di¢ cult.
In transition countries, resources were allocated ine¢ ciently and the production processes were in many cases obsolete. When trade was liberalized and foreign investment permitted, …rms lost market share and major restructuring programs were launched, leading to a considerable amount of job displacements.
Transition inevitably led to the constitution of a group of winners and losers. An intense debate at the beginning of transition opposed those who favored a big bang approach to reforms, to those defending the more gradualistic approach (see Dewatripont and Roland, 1995) . While the former stressed the window of opportunities which allowed radical reforms to be undertaken, the latter focused on the importance of political constraints. In a democratic society, politicians are accountable for the consequences of reforms. Therefore, a big bang strategy will create a large proportion of losers, who will oppose further reforms. Gradualism will then be a more viable strategy.
On the one hand, new opportunities allowed the creation of new …rms, which started developing new products. On the other hand, individuals who were working in …rms and who lost their jobs were very dissatis…ed with the result of the reforms. During election time, losers from the transition process have the right to translate their dissatisfaction in their votes. Therefore, very high levels of job destruction are likely to be associated with a high level of votes for parties opposing fast reforms, while higher job creation will be associated with more votes for the reforming parties, as individuals A small literature has investigated the e¤ect of economic variables (in ‡u-enced by economic reforms) on the voting behavior in transition. Fidrmuc (2000) analyzes whether the consequences of economic reforms determine the political support for the reforming parties. In his paper, elections play the role of referenda on the speed of reforms, rather than rewards or punishments.
He …nds a strong and positive association between regional unemployment rate and votes for the left wing parties opposing reforms. The level of entrepreneurial activity, creating new employment opportunities, had the opposite e¤ect, favoring the parties pushing for further reforms. Jackson et al. (2003) argue that the creation of new …rms is accompanied by the emergence of a part of society that supports reforms, as their fate is linked to the success of the new entrepreneurial …rms. They …nd evidence con…rming this theory during the 1993 and 1997 Polish elections.
We analyze voting behavior at two levels. First, we link the votes for the left wing party to the unemployment rate and the job creation and destruction rates in the constituency. Second, we look at the in ‡uence of the change in job creation and job destruction rates on the change in the votes for individual candidates.
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We …nd that job ‡ows have a strong impact on voting patterns. In our regional analysis, we show that the job destruction rate and unemployment rate have a positive e¤ect on the votes for the SLD, while the job creation rate has a negative e¤ect. In our analysis of votes for individual candidates, we …nd that incumbents from the former right wing coalition received less votes if excess job reallocation had increased in their constituency. Therefore, the balance between the positive and negative e¤ects of reforms determine to a large extent the political outcome.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and 3 brie ‡y reviews the economic and political environment in Poland before the 2001 elections. Section 4 describes the di¤erent elements of our database, constructed from many di¤erent sources. Section 5 presents the empirical methodology, while section 6 shows and discusses the results and their limitations. Section 7 introduces our research agenda. Finally, section 8 concludes.
Economic Situation in Poland
Until recently, Poland has been considered as one of the most successful transition country. It was the …rst country to emerge from the transitionary recession as early as 1993, and it has been growing at a very fast pace since.
Unemployment which had been high in the mid nineties was declining and reached a low in August 1998, going for a short while under 10%. The name of the candidate is associated to his constituency (okr ¾ eg wyborczy) and his party. The database also provides information about the place of the candidate on the party list, the age and the gender of the candidate and his profession. 
Votes by constituency
The dataset provides the votes by party and by constituency, as well as the number of seats awarded to the party, the number of seats allocated to the constituency, the number of registered voters, the number of actual voters, the number of valid votes and the turnout rate.
The data were cross-checked with o¢ cial information provided by the Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza (PKW).
Firm level dataset
Our Polish …rm level dataset is extracted from Amadeus, a collection of company accounts put together by Bureau van Dijk, a commercial data provider. To be included in Amadeus, at least one of the following three criteria must be ful…lled: number of employees larger than 15, operating revenue larger than 1.5 million euros and total assets larger than 3 million euros.
These criteria have been lowered a number of times. The sample covers all medium and large …rms but excludes small …rms which are likely to be more dynamic. This might lead to a downward bias in job creation. Unfortunately, we were not able to get access to census data to improve the accuracy of our variables. However, the bias is likely to be small as these …rms represent the largest share of job ‡ows, by construction of the variables (see next subsection).
Regional job ‡ows
Using the …rm level dataset, we compute our job ‡ows measure by regional unit and by year. Job ‡ows can be computed at di¤erent levels of aggregation.
We start by creating our variables at the level of the voivodship.
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), our job ‡ows variables are de…nes as follows:
8 -The job creation rate in voivodship J at time t (P OS JT ) is equal to the sum of employment gains in expanding …rms divided by the size divided by total employment (an average between t and t-1):
where i is a …rm index, J + is the subset of expanding …rms in J, n is employment and
-The job destruction rate in voivodship J at time t (N EG JT ) is equal to the sum of employment losses in contracting …rms divided by the size divided by total employment:
where J is the subset of contracting …rms.
-The gross job reallocation rate (GROSS Jt ) is the sum of the job creation rate and the job destruction rate. This is a …rst summary measure of Schumpeterian growth, as it re ‡ects simultaneous job creation and job destruction.
-The net job reallocation rate (N ET Jt ) is the di¤erence between the job creation rate and the job destruction rate. This measure provides a useful summary to determine whether creation dominates destruction in the subset and to quantify it.
-The excess job reallocation rate (EXCESS Jt ) is the di¤erence between the gross job reallocation rate and the absolute value of the net job reallocation rate. This is the share of job reallocation in excess of the amount required to accommodate net employment change. This is the most appropriate index of simultaneous job creation and job destruction or Schumpeterian growth. This measure does not increase with N ET while GROSS does.
<Insert table 3> One problem is that these voivodships are large and heterogeneous areas.
To deal with this issue, we compute job ‡ows by constituency (j). It was a rather di¢ cult task to merge the zip codes and names of the towns (Amadeus classi…cation) on the one hand, with the gmynia codes and names of the gmynia on the other, which are subunits of the okreg. In most cases, the name of the gmynia was also the name of the town. However, for the others, we had to look at the zip codes, link it to a database of the Polish Post to …nd out the powiat (another subregion and larger than the gmynia) and the voivodship where the …rm was located. Table 4 presents the average job ‡ows by constituency.
<Insert table 4>
Once we look at more disaggregated areas, we notice important variations within voivodship. We also see that some constituencies have been more creative than destructive, for example the area around Warsaw (okreg 20)
and the Poznan area (okreg 39).
This will also be our unit of analysis, as these sub-areas de…ne the electoral areas. The only di¤erence will be the time dimension, as we use the job ‡ows by year instead of the averages over 1997-2000 used in table 4.
5 Empirical methodology
Votes by constituency
Our …rst speci…cation tests the e¤ect of job ‡ows in constituency j on the share of the seats gained by the SLD in constituency j (V SLD;j ) during the 2001 elections. Our aim is simply to look at whether the economic situation in a region in ‡uences the votes for the opposition party, considered as one (absolute) dimension of the vote.
where j is an index for the constituency, J is an index for the voivodship and X is a group of control variables.
We also use seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) technique to look at the e¤ect of job ‡ows on the votes for the di¤erent parties.
where p is a party index. We only consider parties which obtained seats in the 2001 elections (see section 3).
The variables used as controls are the share of population aged between 20 and 40 years, the share of the population older than 60 years old, the log of density of population, the log of value added by capita and the unemployment rate in 2000 and 1999. All the controls are used at the level of the voivodship.
Votes for individuals
The second type of analysis that we carry on is to test whether the votes for a There is another important reason to consider votes for individuals rather than votes for parties. In Poland, the party system is probably less coherent than in well established Western democracies, and personality might receive more weight in the voter's decision. Controlling for the …xed element of personality, we can measure the e¤ect of party a¢ liation and responsibility in previous decision making.
We look at the e¤ect of the change of job reallocation on the change in votes for candidates. However, change in job reallocation should not a¤ect all candidates in the same way. Indeed, individuals who are more likely to be a¤ected by the change in economic situation in the constituency are those who were responsible for the economic situation during the period, i.e. those politicians previously elected (Incumbent). Moreover, we can take the hypothesis that incumbents will be treated di¤erently whether they were members of the ruling coalition (Right1997) than if they were members of the opposition. We use excess job reallocation as a measure of restructuring in the constituency. As mentioned earlier, this is the most appropriate index of creative destruction, and the one which is more linked to the change in votes for individuals.
We run the following regression:.
where the control variables used are Incumbent, Incumbent Right1997, Right1997, party dummies and the change in the place on the party list.
Moreover, to control for the change in the size of the constituencies, we add a variable equal to the change of registered voters in the area 2 .
2 By doing this, we only consider one dimension of the e¤ect of the constituency change.
The composition of the constituency and the quality of the opponents might have been a¤ected too. We were not able to …nd composition data at the level of the constituency.
We consider the strategic individual and party decisions whether and where to run for election in our companion paper.
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6 Results
Votes by constituency
Result from the estimation of Eq. (1) <Insert table 5> Table 6 shows the SUR results. Results for the SLD are unchanged. PO, PiS and LPR were more likely to receive votes in areas with high job creation and/or low job destruction, con…rming their image as liberal pro-reform parties or more generally as opposition to the SLD-UP. SO on the other hand followed the same pattern than the SLD, but with less intensity, indicating that it was also able to attract those disappointed or harmed by the social consequences of reforms, in line with its populist image. Finally, votes for the PSL were relatively una¤ected by job ‡ows in the constituency, and only 14 negatively related to density, value added per capital and unemployment.
<Insert Table 6> There are many problems associated with this speci…cation. First, the number of observations is very small. There are only 41 observations, and it is quite di¢ cult to add in some dynamics because of the change. Second, most of the control variables are at the level of the voivoidship, while the vote data and the job ‡ows data are at the level of the constituency. We could improve our analysis by adding information on the subregions. However, the exact composition of these is not very clear. Third, there could be a …xed regional e¤ect that could be correlated with our right hand side variables.
To tackle this issue, we would need a dynamic panel. Finally, once we look at very small subregional units, it would be wiser to consider a census of plants rather than the subset used in the paper.
The second solution that we follow in the next subsection is to analyze the votes for individuals, controlling for the fact that the constituencies have changed. By doing it, we increase the number of observations, we can con-trol for (in that case individual) …xed e¤ect, and our results are relatively una¤ected by the change in the regional classi…cation.
Votes for individuals
Result from the estimation of Eq. (3) 
<Insert table 7>
It is not entirely clear in our analysis whether we should use the change in excess job reallocation or simply the level. We used the level in our previous speci…cation to keep a coherent approach when comparing our two empirical strategies, at the level of the constituency and at the individual level. However, we also used the level of excess job reallocation in Eq. (3) and obtained similar results.
To sum up, our results suggest that the Schumpeterian growth process strongly a¤ects the electoral outcome. Voters punish the incumbents if the economic situation in the constituency has deteriorated. Job creation and job destruction matter as they a¤ect the employment and therefore well being of the voters.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have linked the evolution of the labor market to the votes for the left wing party in a voting area, and to the votes for candidates. In our regional analysis, we have found that job creation has a negative e¤ect on the votes for the left wing party while job destruction has the opposite e¤ect.
Moreover, high unemployment rate was also associated with more votes for the left. This suggests that voters are more likely to vote for a new ruling party when the previous one has not delivered results in terms of new jobs.
We have stressed the econometric limitations of our …rst approach, which are partly due to the change in the regional classi…cation in Poland. Our second approach can be seen as more promising and corrects for many of the problems in the regional analysis. We have analyzed the votes for individuals candidates and have found that the votes for incumbents of the previous right wing coalition were lower when excess job reallocation had increased.
This paper therefore shows that, while job ‡ows are often part of a pro-ductivity enhancing process and are often necessary and unavoidable, they also have social consequences on the well being of the voters, who themselves punish those considered as responsible for their hardships. Therefore, a logical conclusion to be drawn from our exercise is that political constraints have to be taken into account by the government when designing its policy, suggesting that gradualism will often be a more appropriate policy for a politician motivated by reelection concerns. A balance between creating new jobs and destroying the old is the key to new success.
There are several additional interesting issues to look at, that do not necessarily concern the Schumpeterian process but rather the dynamics of voting together with career decisions.
Returns to mobility and determinants of party change Before the elections, the coalition in power collapsed and many high pro…le leaders left the AWS and the UW to form their own parties (PO), and others joined new formations. These party changes were probably motivated by di¤erences of opinion, but also by career and reelection motivations. We examine these issues more in details in a companion paper (Smeets and Warzynski, 2003) . 
